"On October 1, [2002], Tenet chaired the National Foreign Intelligence Board, the heads of all the intelligence agencies that released and certified the NIEs [National Intelligence Estimates]...The Top Secret 92-page document that was released said under Key Judgments, "Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons."

...The NIE said the intelligence agencies "assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, cyclosarin and VX" but did not say Iraq actually had any, or that they had any sources who had seen any.

..."Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile," the NIE said..."Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of CW agents."

..."Given the 'dual use' of many such chemicals - for legitimate nonweapons purposes and weapons - the conclusion was speculative."

...On the issue of nuclear weapons, the NIE said with 'moderate confidence' that "Iraq does not yet have a nuclear weapon or sufficient material to make one, but is likely to have one a weapon by 2007 to 2009." ("Plan of Attack," Woodward. pages 197-199)

On Sept. 18, 2002, CIA director George Tenet briefed President Bush in the Oval Office on top-secret intelligence that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction, according to two former senior CIA officers. Bush dismissed as worthless this information from the Iraqi foreign minister, a member of Saddam's inner circle, although it turned out to be accurate in every detail. Tenet never brought it up again.

Nor was the intelligence included in the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002, which stated categorically that Iraq possessed WMD. No one in Congress was aware of the secret intelligence that Saddam had no WMD as the House of Representatives and the Senate voted, a week after the submission of the NIE, on the Authorization for Use of Military Force in Iraq. The information, moreover, was not circulated within the CIA among those agents involved in operations to prove whether Saddam had WMD.

On April 23, 2006, CBS's "60 Minutes" interviewed Tyler Drumheller, the former CIA chief of clandestine operations for Europe, who disclosed that the agency had received documentary intelligence from Naji Sabri, Saddam's foreign minister, that Saddam did not have WMD. "We continued to validate him the whole way through," said Drumheller. "The policy was set. The war in Iraq was coming, and they were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy, to justify the policy."

(http://archive.salon.com/opinion/blumenthal/2007/09/06/bush_wmd/index1.html)